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INTRODUCTION
Since the mid-1950s, a considerable body of literature has emerged examining why firms pay dividends in developed and emerging markets. However, to date, the issue remains controversial. In their pioneering study, Miller and Modigliani (1961) establish that under the assumptions of the perfect capital market, dividend policy is irrelevant and has no impact on firm's value. Since then, many financial researchers challenge Miller and Modigliani's proposition and argue that once the assumptions of the perfect capital market are relaxed dividend policy may matter.
It has been argued that the patterns of corporate payout policies not only vary over time but also across countries, especially between developed and emerging markets (e.g. Al-Malkawi, 2008) . In general, firms in emerging capital markets face more financial constraints and limited resources to finance their investment opportunities, which may result in more reliance on retained earnings and accordingly lower payout ratios. However, consistent with the "outcome model" proposed by La Porta et al. (2000) , the lower corporate governance standards and weaker shareholder protection in such markets suggest higher payout ratios to mitigate agency problem and to maintain a good reputation with shareholders. In the case of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in general and Saudi Arabia in particular, companies operate in a quite distinctive environment. For instance, there are no personal taxes, low or no corporate taxes and companies have less financial constraints than their counterparts in other emerging markets. Furthermore, like many emerging markets, Saudi Arabia is characterized by concentrated ownership (Al-Malkawi, Bhatti and Magableh, 2014).
These differences and the peculiarities of the Saudi market raise the question about the extent to which competing dividend policy theories such as agency, reputation and signaling hypotheses can explain payout policies in such market. Thus, the current study will attempt to answer this question.
Saudi Arabia is the biggest and the largest economy in the GCC region. It is the only country in the Middle East region among the constituents of the G20 and its economy accounts for one-fifth of the region's total GDP (El-Erian et al, 1996) . The market capitalization of Saudi equity market is $203.0 billion (as of 06/30/2014); this would place Saudi Arabia as the 9th largest emerging market country, similar in size to Malaysia or Mexico (Parametric, 2014) . In 2016, the market capitalization of Saudi companies reached to approximately $448.83 billion. The average dividend payouts of Saudi listed companies have improved from 45 .6% in the 2003-2007 period to 63.4% in the 2008-2012 period (AlJazira Capital, 2013) . Similarly, with increasing earnings and dividend payouts, the aggregate dividend yields of Saudi companies improved from 3.7% in 2003 to 4.0% in 2012 (AlJazira Capital, 2013, p.2 ). As can be seen from the aforesaid statistics, Saudi companies exhibit high payout ratios and relatively high dividend yields. Hence, this study is an empirical attempt to examine what factors determine payout policies in such under-researched market.
This paper makes several contributions to our body of knowledge. First, an examination of the effect of ownership structure on dividend payout policy in emerging equity markets such as Saudi Stock Exchange (SSE) is currently not well established in the literature. In addition, the existing work on emerging markets has produced mixed results. Therefore, the current study contributes to the literature by providing a direct test of the impact of ownership structure, such as government, institutional and family shareholdings on the payout policy of Saudi public holding companies. To the best of our knowledge, the present paper is the first of its type to examine the impact of three ownership variables on payout policy within the Saudi context. Second, the paper also examines the relationship between dividend policy and six firm-specific factors for companies listed in SSE. Third, the paper aims to confirm or contradict the current evidence from Saudi Arabia. Fourth, the outcomes of this study could form the basis of future comparative research into other GCC or emerging markets. Finally, the paper will attempt to provide valuable evidence to Saudi investors and policy makers.
The main purpose of this paper, therefore, is to examine the impact of ownership structure and firm-specific factors on the payout policy of firms listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange (SSE). The paper employs panel data analysis to examine 69 nonfinancial companies (552 firm-year observations) for the eight-year period from 2005-2012. Tobit specification is used to estimate those factors affecting the level of dividend payments in Saudi Arabia. For comparison purposes only, pooled OLS estimation is also reported.
The following section presents the theoretical background, hypotheses development and relevant literature. The next section describes the data and research methodology followed by the empirical results. The final section concludes the paper.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, TESTABLE HYPOTHESES AND RELEVANT LITERATURE
In this section, we follow a three-step process. Firstly, we present the theoretical background of the relationship between ownership structure and firmspecific factors and the dividend payout policy, supported by the relevant literature. Secondly, based on the theoretical background and the empirical work we develop the testable hypotheses. Finally, we select and describe the appropriate proxy variables supported by the literature.
Ownership structure
In countries with weak corporate governance and low level of protection for minority shareholders, ownership structure can play a significant role in monitoring managers and therefore reducing agency costs. This suggests less reliance on dividends as a mechanism to reduce agency costs. However, different types of controlling owners may have different influences on corporate dividend payouts (Maury and Pajuste, 2002) . According to Faccio, Lang and Young (2001) , the existence of multiple owners might alleviate expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholder. This implies that firms with multiple owners will pay higher dividends, which in turn suggests a positive relationship between dividend payouts and multiple owners. However, it could be argued that the presence of multiple large shareholders also mitigates the agency problem. This implies a negative rather than positive relationship between multiple owners and dividend payouts. The present study will examine three major modes of ownership namely government, institutional and family shareholdings.
Government ownership
The government or its agencies own and control a large number of publicly traded firms in many countries around the world including Saudi Arabia. Having the government (or its agencies) as a firm's largest shareholder may influence its dividend policy. In state-controlled firms, the government acts on behalf of the citizens (the ultimate owners) who are not directly in control. Therefore, in such firms, "a double principal-agent [conflict] even exists" (Gugler, 2003 (Gugler, , p.1301 . That is, on the one hand, agency problems may arise between citizens and government representatives, as they might not work for the citizens' best interests, and on the other hand between state-owner and other managers. The payment of dividends may reduce the cash flow available to managers, and hence help to alleviate agency problems. Several studies report a positive relationship between dividend payouts and government ownership. For example, using Austrian data, Gugler (2003) 
Family ownership
In family-controlled firms, shareholder-manager conflict is significantly reduced since the managers and the ultimate owners are usually the same and large shareholders (families) have strong incentives and an ability to perform the monitoring role. As a result, the use of dividends as a tool to reduce agency costs or information asymmetry between managers and owners is less valuable, and accordingly, family-owned and controlled firms are expected to have low dividend payout ratios. In addition, the legacy and rent extraction/private benefit hypotheses predict that family-controlled firms pay low dividends. The legacy hypothesis asserts that such companies pay low dividends to preserve the wealth for the next generation of the family while the rent extraction/private benefit hypothesis predicts that family-controlled firms will set a low dividend payout policy in order to retain and use firms' resources for their own benefits (see Amoako-Adu, Baulkaran and Smith, 2014, p.2).
However, the reputation hypothesis predicts that investors may pay less for family-owned firms' stocks because they may feel that family managers may expropriate cash flows from the firm. In order to entice investors to hold restricted voting shares and alleviate concerns about expropriation, familyowned firms may set a high payout policy (see, Amoako-Adu et al., 2014). Furthermore, Al-Kuwari (2009, p.59) maintains that "the main aim of nonfinancial firms listed on the GCC countries is to reduce agency conflict and maintain firm reputation". Therefore, based on the preceding assertion and consistent with Al-Kuwari (2009), we expect a positive relationship between family-owned firms and dividend policy in the case of Saudi Arabia. The percentage held by the family owners (FMLY) is used to measure the family ownership and the following hypothesis is formulated:
H3: Other things being equal, the percentage of family ownership is expected to be positively correlated with dividend payments.
Firm-specific factors

Profitability
Dividends are the distribution of a firm's profits to shareholders. Thus, it can be argued that profitability of a firm is the key determinant in making dividend policy decisions. It is expected that profitable firms are more likely to pay a dividend as compared to non-profitable firms. The pecking order hypothesis, proposed by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) , suggests that firms finance their investments with the internally generated (retained earnings) and if external financing is needed they prefer to issue debt before issuing equity to reduce the costs of information asymmetry and other transactions costs. This financing hierarchy thesis might also have an effect on the dividend decision. That is, taking into account the costs of issuing debt and equity financing, less profitable firms will not find it optimal to pay dividends, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, highly profitable firms are more able to pay dividends and to generate internal funds to finance investments. Therefore, the pecking order hypothesis provides a plausible explanation for the relationship between profitability and dividends. Prominent scholars such Fama and French (2001) interpret their results of the positive impact of profitability on the likelihood to pay dividends for US firms as consistent with the pecking order hypothesis (see also Fama and French, 2002) .
In his classical study on how U.S. managers make dividend decisions, Lintner (1956) finds that the current earnings and previous dividends are the primary factors affecting dividend decision. Further, Baker, Farrelly and Edelman (1986) survey 318 firms listed on New York Stock Exchange and reached a result consentient with Linter's findings. In the more recent study, Baker et al. (2007) find that the level of current and future earnings is one of the key factors affecting dividend policy of Canadian dividendpaying firms. For emerging markets, Al-Malkawi (2007 and 2008) finds that profitability is the main determinant of both the level of dividend payments and the likelihood to pay dividends for companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange, respectively. In the Saudi context, Al-Ajmi and Abo Husain (2011) report a positive relationship between profitability, measured by earnings per share, and the likelihood of paying dividends. More recently, using Tobit specification, Amina (2015) finds a positive association between firm profitability and dividend payout ratio in Saudi Arabia.
In the current study, we employ the return on equity (ROE) as a measure of profitability (PROF). Based on the above discussion and consistent with prior research, PROF is expected to be an important determinant of corporate dividend decision in Saudi Arabia and increase the level of dividend payments. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H4: Other things being equal, profitable firms are expected to pay more dividends.
Business risk
Consistent with dividend signaling hypothesis, Chang and Rhee (1990, p.24) argue that "a firm with stable earnings can predict its future earnings with greater accuracy. Thus, such a firm can commit to paying larger portion of its earnings as dividends with less risk of cutting dividends in the future". This suggests an inverse relationship between variability in earnings and dividend payouts. Baker et al. (2007) show that, the stability of earnings is considered to be a very important factor influencing dividend policy of Canadian dividend-paying firms. More recently, Baker and Powell (2012) report similar finding for Indonesian firm.
Furthermore, as agency theory predicts, dividend payments can mitigate the agency problem between principals (owners) and agents (managers). However, high payout ratios force companies to rely on external financing which in turn increases the transaction costs (Rozef, 1982 
Firm size
Firm size may also affect corporate dividend policy. It has been argued that a large firm has better access to capital markets and finds it easier to raise funds with lower cost and fewer constraints compared to a smaller firm. This indicates that, other things being equal, larger firms have less reliance on the internally generated funds and therefore are more able to pay higher dividends (see, for example, Lloyd, Jahera and Page, 1985, Chang and Rhee, 1990 and Holder et al., 1998). The above assertion is, to a large extent, consistent with transaction costs explanation of dividend policy.
In addition, larger firms exhibit a higher level of information asymmetry and therefore higher agency costs. This implies that larger firms should pay higher dividends to mitigate these costs (see Zeng, 2003 To examine the impact of firm size on dividend policy the current paper employs the natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE). This proxy is widely used in the literature (see, Fama and French, 2002 , Al-Najjar, 2009, and Al-Ajmi and Abo Husain, 2011, among others). Based on the aforesaid discussion and consistent with previous research SIZE is expected to have a positive impact on the dividend payments. This suggests the following hypothesis:
H6: Other things being equal, larger firms are expected to pay more dividends.
Leverage
When a firm acquires debt financing it commits itself to fixed financial charges embodied in the interest payments and the principal amount, and failure to meet these obligations may lead the firm into liquidation. The risk associated with high degrees of financial leverage may, therefore, result in low dividend payments because, ceteris paribus, firms need to maintain their internal cash flow to pay their obligations rather than distributing the cash to shareholders. Moreover, Rozeff (1982) points out that, firms with high financial leverage tend to have low payout ratios to reduce the transaction costs associated with external financing. Therefore, other things being equal, an inverse relationship between financial leverage ratio and dividends is expected. Several studies have found a negative association between leverage and dividends (see To test this hypothesis, the present study uses the ratio of short-term and long-term debt to total assets as a proxy for financial leverage (LEV). This measure has been frequently used in the literature (see, for example, Harada and Nguyen, 2011 and AlAjmi and Abo Husain, 2011). Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H7: Ceteris paribus, firms with high leverage are expected to pay lower dividends.
Growth
Firms with high growth and investment opportunities will need the internally generated funds to finance those investments, and thus tend to pay little or no dividends. This prediction is consistent with the pecking order hypothesis proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984) (Holder et al., 1998 
Firm's age
Generally speaking, mature companies are likely to be in their low-growth phase with fewer investment opportunities (see Barclay et al., 1995 , Grullon et al., 2002 , and Deshmukh, 2003 . These companies are relatively older and do not have the incentives to build-up reserves as a result of low growth and few capital expenditures, which enable them to follow a liberal dividend policy. On the contrary, new or young companies need to build-up reserves to face their rapid growth and financing requirements. Hence, they retain most of their earnings and pay low or no dividends. Other things held constant, as a firm gets older its investment opportunities decline leading to lower growth rates, consequently reducing the firm's funds requirements for capital expenditures. Hence, dividend payout should be positively related to the firm's age. In the present study, therefore, the age of the firm (AGE) is used as a control variable and as a proxy for the firm's maturity or growth opportunities (see, for example, Huergo 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The data
The main objective of this study is to examine the impact of ownership structure and firm-specific factors on corporate payout policy in Saudi Arabia. Due to different financial reporting, our sample includes only non-financial companies. The data is collected mainly from the annual report's publications of non-financial companies listed on the Saudi stock exchange (SSE). In Saudi Arabia, most companies publish their information on both the capital market website and their own websites. Usually, the published reports consist of financial as well as nonfinancial data such as income statements, balance sheets, cash flow statements and ownership structure. The current study covers the eight-year period from 2005 to 2012 for 69 non-financial companies listed on SSE. These companies represent 60.5% of the total non-financial firms listed in 2012.
In order to gain the maximum possible observations, pooled cross-section and time-series data is used. The analysis is based on balanced panel data with 552 firm-year observations (8 years × 69 companies). The present paper includes both dividend-paying as well as non-dividend-paying firms. The exclusion of non-dividend-paying firms results in a well-known selection bias problem (see, for example, Deshmukh, 2003 and Al-Malkawi, 2008).
Methodology
To test the research hypotheses formulated above, two primary empirical models are developed. The first model examines the effect of ownership structure on dividend payout policy, the following censored (Tobit) regression is estimated:
where, for firm i in period t, the variables are described in Table 1 below and is the error term. Next, to test the hypotheses that the firm-specific factors affect payout policy in Saudi Arabia, the following model is written as:
Finally, following the standard literature on dividend policy, Model 1 is extended to control for the firm-specific factors, producing Model 3. We refer to this model as the general model and can be written as: 
Table 1 also shows the expected sign for the independent variables in the regressions. As can be seen, six variables (STATE, INST, FMLY, PROF, SIZE and AGE) are expected to have positive signs (> 0), while three variables (BRISK, LEV and MBR) are predicted to bear negative signs (< 0). A positive (negative) sign suggests that, ceteris paribus, the level of dividend payment, measured by dividend per share, increases (decreases) with the variable. As stated earlier, Models 1 through 3 are estimated using the Tobit maximum likelihood estimator. The selection of Tobit model is necessitated by the unique nature of the dependent variable, dividend per share (DPS). It is well known that, in making dividend payout decision, companies have only two options, either to pay (positive) or not to pay dividends (zero). Therefore, there is what one calls a "mass point" in 0 because the dividends paid by firms can only be positive or nil. The appropriate technique, in this case, is to apply Tobit method of estimations (see Kim and Maddala, 1992) .
Recall that, "because the dependent variable (dividend payout) does not assume negative values", the distribution can be considered censored to the left, a situation in which OLS can produce inconsistent estimates (Abreu and Gulamhussen, 2013, p. 60). Therefore, an alternative approach to model the determinant of dividend payouts is recommended using Tobit model such as the one described by Verbeek (2000, p. 340 In equation (4), generally, i= 1, 2, …, N and t= 1, 2, …, T, whereas the observed dependent variable is based on dividend payments which is expressed as, { = 0 * ≤ 0 = * * > 0 In (4) above, we assume that the right hand side components of the model have the general assumptions; i.e., ( , )~ (0, 0, 2 , 2 ) and the absence of a correlation between these two disturbances indicates zero covariances and correlations between the panels. Also, it assumes that all effects are uncorrelated across individuals (the random effects and the error term are assumed to be ( , 2 ) and ( , 2 ), respectively, and independent of 1 , … , ,with zero means and variances 2 and 2 . The Tobit model is estimated using the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). Several studies have examined corporate payout policy using Tobit specification including Kim and Maddala (1992) Having established that Tobit specification is the appropriate estimation method, our analysis will be based on the Tobit regressions' results. However, for comparison purpose only, we will also estimate the regression coefficients using pooled OLS. Table 2 presents the summary statistics of all the variables used in the analysis. The table reports the number of observations (N), minimum (Min), maximum (Max), standard deviation (SD), mean, median, skewness, and kurtosis for each variable. As can be seen from the table, the variables included in the analysis seem to be not normally distributed as their values of the skewness and kurtosis statistics do not fall between -0.5 and +0.5 and -2 and +2 , the rule of thumb, respectively (e.g., Al-Malkawi et al, 2014). 2 also shows that, for our sample, on average 10.5% of the shares of the Saudi nonfinancial firms held by institutions with a maximum of 66% in certain firms. This suggests that INST is a major player in the SSE. Similarly, on average, 9.85% of Saudi shares held by the government with a maximum of 83.5% in certain firms. The average family ownership is 3.1% with a maximum of 49% in certain firms. Overall, this indicates that ownership structure can play a significant role in determining corporate dividend policy in Saudi Arabia. Table 2 also reveals that the mean (median) debt ratio (LEV) of Saudi non-financial firms is 0.343 (0.296). The mean dividend per share (DPS) is SR 1.577 with a maximum (minimum) of SR 34.468 (0.000) in certain firms. The average age of the sample firms examined in the current research is about 25 years which implies that Saudi firms are mature and well-established. Table 3 presents the correlation matrix for all explanatory variables used in the analysis. The low intercorrelations among the explanatory variables used in the regressions indicate no reason to suspect serious multicollinearity. Table 4 presents the results of the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) of the random effects Tobit models for the link between ownership structure and firm-specific factors and the level of dividend paid by Saudi firms, as measured by dividend per share (DPS). The Wald test statistics reject the null hypothesis that the parameters in the regression equations are jointly equal to zero (Models 1, 2 and 3). The likelihood-ratio (LR) test provides a test for pooled Tobit estimator against the random effects panel estimator. The test statistics are highly significant which indicates that the panel-level variance component is important and, therefore, the pooled estimation is different from the panel estimation. As can be seen from Table 4 , the results support the hypotheses H1, H2, H3, H4, H5, H6, H7 and H9. However, only hypothesis H8 is rejected. Note that, hypothesis H2 is also rejected in Model 3. Furthermore, almost similar results were obtained when pooled OLS regressions were used (see Appendix). Regarding the third variable of ownership structure, the relationship between dividend payments and family ownership (FMLY) is positive. The coefficients on FMLY are significantly different from zero at 5% (coefficient estimate= 9.629, z-stat = 2.16) and 1% (coefficient estimate= 7.354, z-stat = 3.14) levels. Our findings are in line with other studies (e.g. Maury and Pajuste, 2002 ). This result is consistent with the reputation hypothesis that Saudi family-owned firms pay dividends to maintain their reputation and to reduce agency problem between family owners and other minority shareholders (see, Amoako-Adu et al., 2014 and Al-Kuwari, 2009). In sum, the findings presented in this paper provide support to the view that corporate governance, proxied by ownership structure (see, Gugler, 2003 and Maury and Pajuste, 2002) , can play a significant role in mitigating agency problem in the Saudi context.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Summary statistics and correlation among variables
Ownership structure model
Firm-specific factors model
Next, Table 4 also presents the regression results of the impact of firm-specific factors on dividend policy. Model 2 includes six variables expected to influence corporate dividend policy in Saudi Arabia. These factors are profitability (PROF), business risk (BRISK), firm's size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), growth and investment opportunities (MBR) and firm's maturity (AGE). From Model 2, all the variables possess the hypothesized signs with exception to MBR. The coefficient on MBR is positive but statistically not different from zero indicating that growth opportunities as measured by market-to-book ratio which is not a determining factor of dividend policy in Saudi Arabia (Coefficient estimate = 0.072, zstat=1.14).
Similarly, this variable remains insignificant when ownership structure variables are included in the general model (Model 3). This result is consistent with the findings reported by Al-Kuwari (2009), Alzomaia and Al-Khadhiri (2013) and Amina (2015) that growth opportunities are not a determinant of corporate dividend policy in the GCC region including Saudi Arabia.
As can be seen from Another variable found to be a determinant of corporate dividend policy in Saudi Arabia is financial leverage (LEV), measured by the total debt to total assets ratio. The coefficients on LEV are consistently negative and significant at the 1% level in Models 2 and 3. This suggests a higher level of financial leverage reduces dividend payouts, consistent with transaction costs hypothesis. Aivazian et al. (2003) find that debt and dividend payments are negatively related for firms operating in emerging markets. Similarly, Amina (2015) and Al-Kuwari (2009) obtain the negative and statistically significant relationship between leverage and dividend payments in the GCC region including Saudi Arabia. However, Al-Ajmi and Abo Husain (2011) report mixed results with regard to leverage in the Saudi context.
Finally, as can be seen, form Table 4 , firm age is found to be robustly significant. As expected, the coefficients on AGE are positive and highly significant at 1% level or better. This suggests that mature firms pay more dividends in Saudi Arabia. This result provides support for the maturity hypothesis proposed by Grullon et al. (2002) . The similar result reported by Al-Malkawi (2007) for Jordanian firms. Overall, our findings are generally consistent with the agency costs, reputation and the transaction costs hypotheses. The evidence also lends some support for the signaling and the pecking order arguments.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this research was to examine the impact of ownership structure and firm-specific factors on corporate payout policy in Saudi Arabia. Using Tobit specification the analysis is based on panel data with 552 firm-year observations covering the period from 2005 to 2012. Three empirical models were developed, ownership structure model, firm-specific factors model, and the general model. The results revealed that ownership structure including government (STATE), institutional (INST) and family (FMLY) shareholdings are important determinants of corporate dividend policy in Saudi Arabia. More specifically, ownership concentration positively affects dividend payments, as measured by dividend per share. The findings provide support to both the agency costs theory and the reputation hypothesis.
The results also showed that five firm-specific factors namely profitability (PROF), business risk (BRISK), firm's size (SIZE), leverage (LEV) and firm maturity (AGE) seem to influence corporate dividend policy in Saudi Arabia. Three factors including PROF, SIZE and AGE have a positive relationship with dividends, while BRISK and LEV are negatively correlated with dividend policy. More specifically, dividend payments increase with firm size, profitability and maturity. That is, larger, mature and more profitable firms pay higher dividends in Saudi Arabia. However, firms with more earnings variability (business risk) and more debt (leverage) pay lower dividends. These results are generally consistent with the agency costs and the transaction costs hypotheses. The evidence also lends some support for the signaling and the pecking order arguments.
These findings have some practical implications. First, for Saudi companies, the evidence shows that dividends can be used as a mechanism to mitigate agency costs and maintain good reputation in the market because, by and large, the results presented in this paper are consistent with those two hypotheses. Second, policymakers of Saudi Capital Market Authority (CMA) should give more attention to dividend policy as an important internal corporate governance mechanism to reduce agency problem. Finally, Saudi investors may use the findings of this study as a guide to make better investment decisions. For instance, investors seeking high dividend payouts might invest in companies that possess government and family shareholdings in their ownership structure. Likewise, firm-specific factors such as size, profitability, age, leverage, and business risk might be considered in the investment decision making. However, due to potential limitations pertaining to the reliability of the data collected or the proxy variables used in the study, our conclusion may need to be treated with caution.
